Research
Research
My work mostly falls somewhere in the intersection of ethics, practical reason, and the philosophy of action.
My dissertation is about self-transformation. It asks what kind of agency, if any, we can exercise over our own values and attachments. I challenge a view of transformative agency on which it consists in radically self-creative acts of will. Instead, I argue, we can make sense of transformative agency by seeing it as arising out of an extended process of self-interpretation. My dissertation is advised by Sharon Street, Miranda Fricker and Sanford Diehl.
In the philosophy of action, I'm interested in corrective virtues, traits which help imperfect agents to function better. I defend a novel account of perseverance in terms of practical reasoning policies, and I'm working on extending this account to other corrective virtues.
In ethics, I'm interested in what interpersonal relations and moral repair look like under conditions of intractable disagreement.
"How to Persevere" (forthcoming). Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Abstract: Perseverance in the face of discouraging developments is crucial to the successful pursuit of long-term projects. But how to ensure one perseveres? Epistemically, by maintaining an optimistic outlook (‘optimism’), or practically, by being less disposed to quit given one’s outlook (‘tenacity’)? This paper critiques optimism and defends a new account of tenacity which centres on reasoning policies, policies about how to conduct practical reasoning. Because philosophical discussion of commitment has typically focused on straightforward short-term undertakings, there are currently no appealing accounts of tenacity in long-term projects, which require a distinctive sensitivity to new reasons to quit. On the approach I propose, rather than being directly committed to one’s project, one is committed to a reasoning policy which specifies how to deliberate about whether to quit. This allows for sensitivity to new reasons while avoiding the pitfalls of optimism. Reasoning policies, I suggest, offer a powerful tool for theorising about non-ideal agency.
A paper defending apologies which deny wrongdoing (under review; draft available).
A paper critiquing a voluntaristic view of self-transformation.
A paper on corrective virtues.